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SOME EFFECTS OF THE SECURITIES ACT UPON
INVESTMENT BANKING
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS* AND GEORGE E. BATESt
A HOST of imponderable factors-political, psychological, economic
-make prediction of the effects of the Securities Act of 1933' as
respects any group or groups hazardous. Especially is this true of the
institutions or individuals commonly identified as investment bankers.
It is equally difficult to predict effects of the Act upon the performance of
investment banking functions particularly without full recognition of the
effects of the Act upon issuers, their officers and experts, and upon the
forms and types of securities issued.2 Nevertheless at the risk of the arti-
ficiality of an abstraction which gives but slight recognition to those vari-
ous factors, it is the purpose of this essay to single out for discussion the
effects of the Act bearing directly upon the performance of investment
banking functions. Of necessity the conclusions must be general, and
descriptive merely of possible or probable trends. Furthermore they will
be restricted largely to a description of the impact of the Act-in terms of
increased or lessened business or legal risks-on the performance of the
functions of investment banking.
Those functions are scarcely differentiated by the Act. 3 It makes no dis-
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x 73d Congress, H. R. 548o, Title I, approved by the President May 27, I933, hereinafter
cited as the "Act."
2 In a forthcoming issue of the Yale Law Journal the authors expect to set forth those other
effects of the Act and relate them to investment banking as they affect the volume and char-
acter of issues offered. For the constitutionality of the Act, assumed and not discussed in this
essay, reference is made to an article by Professor Nathan Isaacs in the same issue of the Yale
Law Journal.
3 As commonly defined, investment banking comprises the gathering of a multitude of
small savings for bulk long-term investment in political units, industry, trade, commodities,
and real estate. As such it may be variously, and often jointly, performed by the issuers of the
securities involved, some intermediate issuers such as political bodies or investment companies,
such institutions as insurance companies, savings banks, and even commercial banks, and
specialists in the granting and underwriting of long-term credits and the distribution of se-
curities to investors and investing institutions.
These specialists are known as investment bankers, though sometimes the term is confined
to a small number of them who originate or are the principal underwriters for the majority of
security issues (also variously described as "originators," "underwriters" and "houses of is-
sue"), and at times is extended to include every small retailer. (Even the door-to-door peddler
of highly speculative promotional stock or of purely fake securities has seen fit to appropriate
the title.)
Not comprehended in the foregoing definition are some transactions, such as those effecting
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tinction in terms between originating houses and other underwriters, nor
between principal underwriters and sub-underwriters. 4 Accordingly a
realistic conception of the processes involved is essential in order to under-
-stand this significant experiment in social control over finance.
ORIGINATING
As distinguished from the technical underwriting of an issue, some in-
vestment banker, herein referred to as the "originator," must approach, be
approached by, promote, or control, the prospective issuer of securities.
Before deciding upon the desirability of buying, underwriting the sale of,
or distributing those securities he must make, or cause experts t6 make, an
investigation of the enterprise, the securities proposed to be issued, and
the market in which they will be offered.5 If the credit or capital invest-
ment appears warranted and practicable, he may then advise the prospec-
tive issuer as to the type and form of security which will best meet its re-
quirements and those of the market. Here typically begin negotiations,
sometimes protracted, over the sum to be raised, the precise nature of the
security, the inclusion of protective provisions, the kind of issue, the price,
and the gross spread.
In the performance of the foregoing function the originator does not be-
come an "underwriter" under the Act.6 If, in the event of "underwriting"
then being assumed by others, he should divorce himself from the under-
taking, he would incur no risks under the Act, except those that might
follow upon the use of his name, as giving authority to any statements
made in the registration statement,7 or from his possible control over the
the transfer of a block of outstanding securities from one group of investors to another, which
are usually considered to be investment banking when involving general distribution (and
normally investigation, negotiation, and underwriting).
Much popular confusion in terminology (and consequently in analysis) has resulted from the
performance by these investment bankers of many non-investment banking functions, such as
brokerage and commercial banking, and from the incidental performance by brokers, commer-
cial bankers, investment counselors, and others of investment banking functions.
4 Both security merchants and brokers are defined as "dealers" in §' 2(12). Some mer-
chants and brokers are classed as "underwriters" in § 2(1I), which provides no classification
of underwriting. § 4 (I) and (2) implies some further distinction, but is not clear.
s Even the seemingly voluminous requirements for the registration statement under Sched-
ules A and B would comprise but a portion of the facts usually necessary for the formation of
the banker's judgment.
6 Since under § 2(11) he has not purchased from or sold for an issuer. If he subsequently
becomes an "underwriter" under § 2(1), these "preliminary negotiations or agreements"
are specifically excluded under § 2(3). Query, if he later takes no commitment might he not
be an underwriter because of his "participation"?
7 § iI (a)(4) and (b)( 3 ) (B) (I) and (I).
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issuer, its officers or experts. 8 In contrast to the Companies Act, his possible
connection with the issuer as a promoter involves no additional risk.9
In practice, however, the originator has normally contemplated partici-
pation in the underwriting. It has been one of his further functions to
organize, manage, and represent the underwriters and distributors in deal-
ing with the issue. At that point he would become an "underwriter" under
the Act. His obligations, not being differentiated from those of other
"underwriters" by the Act, will be discussed in the following section.
Inasmuch as the originator is the most prominent of the investment
banking houses identified with the issue and is in direct contact with the
issuer, upon it usually has rested responsibility for keeping watch over the
issue and the affairs of the issuer and, in the event of difficulty, impending
or actual, to represent the interests of the holders of the security it has
originated.-° The Act imposes new deterrents to a part of this r6le of the
9 § 15 and, as to representation in management, § ri(a)(2). The representation of invest-
ment bankers upon the boards of directors of issuers has been fairly common. It has been
looked upon by many as affording some measure of protection to security holders; others have
taken it as evidence of banker control of industry and as a means of business promotion for in-
vestment bankers and of affording some insurance for them against future issues going to com-
petitors.
9 i9 and 2o Geo. 5, c. 23. Under § 37 which imposes liability for "any untrue statement" in
the prospectus "every person being a promoter of the company" and "every person who has
authorized the issue of the prospectus" are among those held liable to subscribers. The term
promoter is defined in § 37(4) as meaning "a promoter who was a party to the preparation of
the prospectus, or of the portion thereof containing the untrue statement, but does not include
any person by reason of his acting in a professional capacity for persons engaged in procuring
the formation of the company." Originators therefore would not necessarily be liable under the
Companies Act unless they had become parties to the preparation of the prospectus or of that
portion sued upon. Such participation under our Act without more would not impose any
liability by virtue of the Act. Yet as Berle points out "Though not definitely stated, the 'pro-
moter' is also in the picture but he is left to be determined by the ordinary processes of the
common law, and litigation may be expected on this point." Berle, New Protection for Buyers
of Securities, N.Y. Times, June 4, '933, § 8, p. .
The point of departure between our Act and the English Act on this point seems clear. The
latter is designed to hold responsible those who in light of their investigation (or perhaps re-
gardless of it) proceed to prepare for the public misleading and inaccurate prospectuses. Our
Act, however, is not primarily concerned with the person who made the investigation, who was
in a position to verify the statements, and who aided or abetted the issuer of the prospectus in
advertising inaccurate or misleading statements. It is only when that person steps into the
r6le of underwriter that the Act regulates him. This may or may not be an improvement over
the English procedure. The possible difficulties resulting from separating liability from the in-
vestigatory functions of the investment banker will appear more clearly in the subsequent dis-
cussion in the text.
10 Doubtless cases exist in which investment bankers have performed this function more
with a view to further profit than to the protection of security holders, and such instances or
the allegation of such motivation has led to much criticism. Were originating houses to refrain
from the performance of that function, however, criticism probably would be aroused and their
issues suffer disrepute.
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originator, since as an "underwriter" he is made subject to liabilities dis-
cussed in the following section."
The result is that as originator the banker assumes but few new legal
risks under the Act in his promotional or strict originating r6le. It is un-
derwriting, not investigation or promotion, that is material under the Act.
UNDERWRITING
Great variety in procedure has been characteristic of "underwriting"
in this country. This flexibility has permitted the evolution of methods
adapted to continually changing conditions. The variety and complexity
of method, however, and the shifting application of the word "under-
writing" have not promoted popular understanding. To an extent strict
underwriting (i.e., an agreement by one party to compensate another to
the extent of the latter's failure to obtain purchasers for an issue, or to
take from the latter such unsold portion of the issue at a price)" has con-
tinued in existence along with, and frequently in conjunction with, out-
right purchase (or agreements to find purchasers) of issues. Both such
purchases and true underwriting have been denominated "underwriting."
Further complication has resulted from the employment of this "under-
writing" device as a means of wholesale distribution for securities.
Perhaps an example will clarify what is meant by these various types of
underwriting:
r. To refund a maturing note a prospective issuer of additional common stock plans
an offering for cash to existing stockholders, because of their preemptive rights. In
order to obtain an amount certain to meet the maturity, it desires to "insure" the sale
to stockholders. An originating banker is approached, who upon investigating decides
that he will underwrite the sale for a commission (analogous to an insurance "premi-
um") of i% of the entire issue plus an additional 4% of the amount unsubscribed by
stockholders and required to be taken up by the underwriter23 Inasmuch as the
amount involved is large and his capital insufficient for conservatively carrying the
risk alone, the banker either agrees to form, or forms, an underwriting group to take
this commitment; or he may take the commitment alone but almost immediately
transfer it ("re-insure" in the insurance analogy) to a group of underwriters of which
"See discussion infra, p. 286.
"In re Licensed Victuallers' Mutual Trading Ass'n., L.R. 42 Ch. D. i (i889) defines under-
writing (in what might be called its technical or strict legal sense) as "an agreement entered
into before the shares are brought before the public, that in the event of the public not taking
up the whole of them, or the number mentioned in ,the agreement, the underwriter will, for an
agreed commission, take an allotment of such part of the shares as the public has not applied
for."
3The hypothetical commissions used would seem to indicate that although this banker
seemed doubtful of the success of the offering to stockholders he judged that the underwriters
would be able to dispose of it without too great difficulty.
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he will probably be a member. This is a type of what has been described as strict
underwriting.
2. If stockholders subscribe for the entire issue, the underwriters receive their i%
commission as a gross profit from which they would deduct their expenses and out of
which strict accounting would require their establishing reserves adequate to meet
losses on unsuccessful underwritings (if the risks were predictable on an actuarial
basis). Assume, however, that the stockholders subscribed for only 20% of the issue.
Then the underwriters would receive their i% commission on that 20%, while they
would be required to take up the remaining 8o% of the stock from the issuer at the
offering price to the stockholders less 5%. The net result would be to leave them
5-%, less expenses, on which to distribute the stock acquired ff sold at the price at
which it had been offered to stockholders. To simplify the illustration let it be as-
sumed that the offering price (say, of $ioo per share) had coincided with the market,
so that the subscription privilege ("rights") given stockholders was valueless, and that
the market had not varied during the subscription period. The underwriters then
might decide to market the issue at or slightly below the same price.4
Because the failure of stockholders to take more of the issue showed the risk to be
greater than perhaps originally estimated, and because the underwriters probably
would desire assurance of promptly disposing of the stock in order to free their capital
for other underwriting, they might then form another and perhaps larger underwriting
group to guarantee their sale of the issue. This group might be asked to buy so much
of the stock from the original group as would reduce its commitment the desired
amount, but since it would be more advantageous to have a single group under one
management, the members of the original group would probably become members of
the second and larger group, which would acquire the entire issue. (The transfer from
the first to the second group might be at $95 per share, giving the former 25e for ex-
penses, profit, and the risk incurred, and the latter $5 on which to cover risks, expenses
of distribution, and profit.) This type of purchase rather than strict underwriting or
guarantee of sale has been commonly used, and has been commonly called "under-
writing." To avoid an unnecessary number of transfers, upon which transfer taxes
would accrue, however, it is probable that the commitment of the second group in this
example would take the form of a strict underwriting. (In that event, the commission
to the second group might be 5oc per share with a contingent take-up price of $95.50
per share.)
3. Since this group was only made large enough to assure adequate spread of the
risk, but not so large as to cause uncertainty or delay in accomplishing this purpose, its
members might either lack or have insufficient retailing capacity to distribute all the
stock. A much larger group would then be formed for the purpose of wholesaling the
issue. (Or two or more groups might be formed with a view to giving certain retailers,
through membership in more than one group, greater compensation, either as reward
in the nature of a special quantity discount for taking larger allotments of stock to re-
tail, or for other past or prospective services.) For this purpose a so-called selling syn-
dicate might be used in which all members agreed to underwrite a certain proportion
Z4 In most cases the stockholders' failure to subscribe would be the result of a fall in the
market which made the privilege valueless, with the result that underwriters would either have
to carry the stock speculatively against a rise in the market or sell it at a lower price which
would either materially reduce or more than wipe out their margin.
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of the whole but might actually retail a greater or lesser amount or none. An alterna-
tive would be to use a selling group whose members were not called upon technically to
underwrite but to purchase the stock at wholesale (that is, at the retail price less a
selling commission). Insofar as retailers actually subscribed for stock in the selling
group the risk would be as effectively transferred as in an underwriting syndicate. If
all selling group members purchased stock in this way for resale the transference of risk
from the underwriting group (except those risks possibly incurred through a trading
account) would be as effective as in an underwriting (especially if the latter sort were of
limited liability and did not involve a trading account). Under many circumstances,
however, retail dealers would subscribe only as they received orders from customers.
In a sense they might appear then to be acting merely as brokers.'s In many cases
they would not acquire title to the stock, but it would pass directly to the investor.'6
While the foregoing example over-simplifies the problem of underwrit-
ing, it will suffice for the purpose of examining some possible effects of the
Act on such practices.
The result may or may not be a radical change in this procedure.
Prophecy is difficult. Yet it may well be that the effect of the Act will be
in the direction of retarding the affiliation of substantial houses in such
undertakings. These are the reasons. In the first place, the word "sell" as
defined in § 2(3) expressly excludes "preliminary negotiations or agree-
ments between an issuer and any underwriter." But negotiations or agree-
ments between the originating house and other houses which are ap-
proached by the originating house for participation in the underwriting
are not excluded. Hence offering such participation to other houses would
be an "offer to sell" or "attempt or offer to dispose of" a security or an
"interest in a security." Under § 2(3) the risks of the originating house in
so selling or offering to sell might be considerable in case any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or the mails were employed.17 Unless a registration statement were in
effect § 5 would be violated. Its wilful violation may entail either a $5000
Is Cf. Bates & Douglas, Secondary Distribution of Securities-Problems Suggested by Kin-
ney v. Glenny, 41 Yale L. Jour. 949-xoo4 (x932).
16 See article by the authors in Yale L. Jour., Nov. 1933, entitled Stock "Brokers" as
Agents and Dealers.
17 It should be noted, however, that civil liability under § 12 would probably follow even
though only part of the entire transaction was consummated in interstate commerce or through
the mails. Thus solicitation of the sale through the mails or by interstate commerce followed
by delivery of the security in a wholly intrastate transaction without use of the mails would
probably suffice, and vice versa. § 2(7) defines "interstate commerce" as meaning "trade or
commerce in securities or any transportation or communication relating thereto" etc. See
Dean, The Federal Securities Act: 1, 8 Fortune 50 (1933). A similar observation can be made
under § ir with the following qualification. See Reg. No. 85, H. R. 73d Cong. 1st Sess. p. 22.
A person is entitled to rely on the registration (and need not prove he relied on it) even though
his particular transaction was an intrastate sale not involving the use of the mails. § 5(c),
however, exempts "the sale of any security where the issue of which it is a part is sold only to
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fine or five years in prison or both."8 Furthermore, any of the houses tak-
ing participation from the originating house could sue the latter for dam-
ages or for rescission 9 any time within two years thereafter.20 And the
action for damages need show no causal relationship whatsoever between
anything the originating house said or did and what subsequently hap-
pened to the security."
Yet even if a registration statement is in effect, or even though the
security is not required to be registered, the originating house takes the
risk [except as to securities exempt under 3(a) (2)]22 of a suit for damages
or rescission by the participating houses if agencies of interstate commerce
or the mails have been used in the communication and the latter includes
an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements in light of the circumstances under which
they were made not misleading.23
The result desired (viz., a wider distribution of the underwriting risk)
may be partially effected by bringing into the preliminary negotiations
with the issuer all of the houses who are going to participate directly or
indirectly in the underwriting, or by having the issuer itself make up the
banking and purchase syndicates through direct negotiations with them.
The former is impracticable to any great extent. 4 The latter entails the
persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such securities is a person
resident and doing business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business
within, such State or Territory."
18 § 24. Possible liability under § 17 should also be noted. That section merely makes it
"unlawful for any person in the sale of any securities" by the use of interstate agencies or of the
mails, inter alia, "to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading." None of the
securities otherwise exempted from the Act are exempted from the operation of this section.
The nature or extent of liability is not stated in § i7. The use of the word "unlawful" coupled
with the fact that §§ 1i and 12 specify the civil liabilities under the Act leads to the inference
that § 17 is criminal not civil. If so, the penalties would be exacted under § 24 only for wilful
violations. If, however, the section imposes civil liability, it goes far beyond even § 12(2) which
after all exempts certain securities, gives defenses of the exercise of reasonable care and of the
knowledge of the purchaser of the untruth or omission, and limits recovery to the person
"purchasing such security from him." Possible ambiguity in § i7 should be clarified by amend-
ment.
19 § 12(1).
- § 13. Due to lack of clarity the period might be interpreted as ten years.
21 This would not necessarily follow in a suit under § 12(2). But the purchaser to make out
a case under§ 12(1) need only show a violation of § 5.
§ 12(2). 23 Id. See also supra, note 17.
24 Conceivably the issuer might approach a small group of banking houses the members of
which could severally investigate the financing. [The Act provides no guide, however, as to
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risk that the issuer acting under the supervision and direction of the
originating house might be held to be the agent of the originating
house. In such event the originator would run afoul of §§ 5 and 12 in the
same way as if it had not acted through the instrumentality of another.
These difficulties insofar as they involve increased risks of liability of
the originating house to participating houses may be partially discounted
by the fact that members of the banking fraternity would be less likely to
attempt to renig against one of the fraternity than would outsiders. Yet
no matter how these risks are discounted even larger ones remain. By
definition in § 2 (1i) every member of a banking syndicate, every member
of a purchase syndicate, every member of a selling syndicate, and con-
ceivably every member of a selling group 2 becomes an underwriter. The
security (not being exempt) is registered. If the registration statement
contained "an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a
material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the state-
ments therein not misleading," any person acquiring the security (unless
it were proved 'that at the time he acquired the security he knew of such
untruth or omission) could sue "every underwriter" for damages or for
rescission.26 To this there are several exceptions, the two most relevant
here being the following: (i) If that part of the registration statement was
made on the authority of an expert (other than himself) he is not liable if
he had reasonable ground for belief and did believe that the statements
were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact;27
(2) In case the error or omission was in a part of the registration state-
ment not purporting to be made on the authority of an expert nor to be
taken from his report or from some public document, then to escape liabil-
ity he must prove that he had "after reasonable investigation, reasonable
ground to believe and did believe" that the statement was accurate.s
how far they could cooperate to avoid duplication of effort and expense and to reach agreement
by negotiation as to the kind and provisions of the security and the conditions of its offering
without running foul of § 5 under the definition of "sell" in § 2(3)]. If the issuer was at a dis-
tance from a financial center or were relatively unknown, the difficulties and expense of such a
course would obviously be multiplied. For issues of such size as to require a considerable
spread of the risk to achieve real underwriting, the impracticability is apparent of an issuer
attempting to approach a hundred or more prospective underwriters (scattered from Boston to
Los Angeles and from Minneapolis to New Orleans), each of whom would be required to make
such an investigation as would be proper to a fiduciary, and among whom agreement could
scarcely be expected as to the forms of contracts and "indentures," the price and spread, and
similar considerations (unless the issuer were constantly in the capital market and, so, thorough-
ly conversant with its current demands).
2S In case, for example, the selling group agreement required members to repurchase secu-
rities coming back upon the market during a specified period.
26 § x(a) 5. 7 § ri(b) (3) (C). 28 § ii(b) (3) (A).
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And the standard of reasonableness imposed is "that required of a person
occupying a fiduciary relationship. ' '29
A house offered participation in a banking or purchase syndicate usu-
ally will not have the benefit of reliance on an expert for every statement
in the registration statement. Probably the bulk of the statement will be
comprised of facts which it must reasonably believe to be true after its
own reasonable investigation. And in making its investigation it must re-
member that it is a fiduciary. As a practical matter it cannot duplicate the
study which the originating house made. Nor can it even go so far as to
examine all the data which the originating house has collected. Not only
would time and expense be prohibitive but frequently it would have no
facilities for making the investigation. It has arrived at a point where it
must take a chance. That chance would be that the originating house had
made a thorough check and that it and the issuer had prepared a registra-
tion statement that would stand up under the critical eyes of § xx and
juries throughout the land.3° It could hardly be said to have made a
reasonable investigation if it merely accepted the originator's word.3' The
risk it would assume would not be measured by the contract it had made
with the originating house. Regardless of its commitment thereunder it
would be responsible to investors for the whole issue. Under § ii the lia-
bility in rescission would be the consideration paid for the security.32 If,
29 § XI(C). Criticism of the Act is frequently heard on the grounds that this standard is too
high and that the chances of liability in hard cases is great, especially at the hands of juries.
This point will be developed in the forthcoming article in the Yale Law Journal. A rather wide
sample of cases indicates in general that the rule is fairly uniform and not unreasonably severe.
It is stated in the Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Tent. Draft No. 2, § i69 as follows:
"The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care
and skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property; and
if the trustee has greater skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is under a duty to
exercise such skill as he has."
30 It should be noted that § 22(a) gives State and Territorial courts jurisdiction concurrent
with federal district courts in all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any lia-
bility or duty created by the Act. The desirability of restricting jurisdiction to the Federal
courts will be discussed in the forthcoming article in the Yale Law Journal.
31 It would seem doubtful that the entire registration statement would purport to be made
on the authority of the originator as an "expert." Acceptance of the originator's word where
the originator admittedly was a banking house of great character, repute, and reliability could
hardly pass as a substitute for this underwriter's own "reasonable investigation." Cf. Adams
v. Thrift, [1QI1] 2 Ch. 21. Under the English Companies Act § 37, however, the defenses avail-
able to persons liable, e.g. directors, include "reasonable ground to believe" that the statement
in the prospectus was true. Hence the English cases are not particularly relevant in determin-
ing the meaning of "reasonable investigation" under § ii of the Act.
32 With interest, less amount of income received. § ii (e). And in no event would the plain-
tiff be entitled to recover more than the price at which the security was "offered to the public."
§ ri(g).
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however, plaintiff has sold the security, he is entitled to damages in an
amount limited to the price at which the security was offered to the pub-
lic. 3 Among the various ambiguities and uncertainties in the section only
two need be mentioned here. A strict reading of § ii eliminates all ele-
ments of causation. The untrue statements or the omissions apparently
need have no causal relation either to the investment or to the damages. 34
And while a particular plaintiff may recover an amount not in excess of the
price at which the security was offered to the public, the aggregate amount
so recoverable is not thus limited expressly. Theoretically, therefore, suits
for damages by successive purchasers of the security might cause the dam-
ages to mount way above the amount of the issue or the total offering
price. An attempt to resolve these provisions of § i i into a workable and
congruous whole will not be attempted here. It is believed, however, that
even without amendment the section would be interpreted not literally but
with common sense by the courts.35 Yet its perplexity and uncertainty
add but one more factor to the pyschological (if not legal) hazard con-
fronting "underwriters" (and their counsel). The result of the combina-
tion of these uncertainties may be a tendency to reduce the number of
banking houses participating as "underwriters" of issues.36 For only those
who can act substantially as originators would seem to be able to satisfy
the tests of reasonable investigation set down in § i i 37 and therefore able
to avoid running the gauntlet of diverse court rulings on the ambiguities
and uncertainties in the damage clauses of that section.
33 § ii(e) and (g).
34 For comparison with some of the companies acts in England see Cackett v. Keswick, 85
L. T. Rep. i4, i6 (igoi); In re Wimbledon Olympia Ltd., [igio] i Ch. 63o, 632.
3s See in this connection the interpretation given by Baldwin B. Bane, Chief of Securities
Division, Federal Trade Commission, released Sept. 22, 1933 and published in the N.Y. Times,
p. 21, Sept. 23, 1933.
36 It is assumed throughout that underwriters (in a business sense rather than that of the
Act) are those actually able to finance their proportionate share of an underwriting, not merely
those willing to have issuers gamble on their ability to sell some portion or the whole of an issue
(even though these latter frequently refer to themselves as underwriters).
37 It might be possible for originators or principal underwriters to protect sub-undenvriterg
by having every detail in the registration statement vouched for by recognized authorities (if
such could be found, other than strawmen whose lack of substance or independence might raise
question as to their reliability, who would assume joint and several liability for the whole issue)
upon whose statements courts might hold sub-underwriters and dealers justified in relying as
fiduciaries.
It is true that the person held liable might have an action of contribution against others
under § xi(f). Full analysis of that section is not possible here. The action would be "as in
cases of contract" and would lie against "any person, who, if sued separately, would have been
liable to make the same payment, unless the person who has become liable was, and the other
was not, guilty of fraudulent misrepresentations."
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The provisions in § 8 that the effective date of a registration statement
shall be the twentieth day after filing 38 and that the Federal Trade Com-
mission has the power to issue stop orders in case of untrue or misleading
registration statements39 will certainly affect the form if not the substance
of underwriting agreements. These provisions have been thought by some
to mean the end of any commitments by bankers to underwrite the issue
for the company. It probably would be more accurate to predict that in
underwriting agreements in the future there will appear many new hedge
clauses conditioning the firm commitments of bankers, since the issuance
of a stop order would be disastrous to any plans for marketing in the near
future. Furthermore since market prices and conditions are by no means
static and might vary considerably during the waiting period, clauses
covering the adjustment of price and consequently the "spread" of the
bankers will probably appear. It may be 40 that amendments to the regis-
tration statement will have to be filed in order to state the new offering
price and any accompanying adjustment to the bankers' "spread," al-
though in some cases adequate formulae can probably be worked out
making this unnecessary.
But, since, as discussed above, negotiations between the originating
house and other prospective underwriters cannot safely proceed4' unless
the security is registered, it is to be expected that amendments covering
the details of underwriting will be filed after the expiration of the twenty
day period. Their effective date is determinable by the Commission42
Thus the actual waiting period may be much longer than twenty days.
The uncertainty of getting any underwriting will therefore continue until
after the twenty day period. That may well result in the additional hedge
clause qualifying or conditioning the commitment of the originator to the
issuer on the success of the subsequent attempts to obtain underwriting.
These changes in procedure, disastrous as they may seem to some, are
probably merely matters of detail as compared with the fundamental
change which the Act makes as respects the responsibility of underwriters.
This latter feature when taken in conjunction with the changing forms of
,8 § 8(a). 39 § 8 (d) (e) and (f).
40 Schedule A(i6) provides that "A variation in price may be proposed prior to the date of
the public offering of the security, but the Commission shall immediately be notified of such
variation." Such notification conceivably need not be in form of an amendment to the regis-
tration statement. But it is not clear. Until the Commission has ruled otherwise it would obvi-
ously be the course of prudence to amend pursuant to § 8.
41 Note that such transactions are specifically exempted from certain provisions of the Eng-
lish Companies Act. See § 35(3).
2 .... having due regard to the public interest and the protection of investors." § 8(c).
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procedure may have great significance primarily as respects the issuer,
secondarily as respects the investors.
In passing, one other problem raised in connection with the definition of
"underwriter" in the Act should be noted. When read carefully it includes
all those who are commonly known as underwriters except perhaps the
strict underwriter. An underwriter is not necessarily one who "has pur-
chased from an issuer with a view to, or sells for an issuer in connection
with, the distribution of any security" nor anyone who participates
directly or indirectly in "such undertaking" or participates in the direct
or indirect "underwriting" (obviously used in the sense in which it
is defined) of "such undertaking." The strict underwriter who merely
agrees to take the securities at a price if the issuer cannot sell them
may or may not purchase them "with a view to" distribution. Distribu-
tion at that time would usually be out of the question. He may take them
with a view to management of the company or to a long-term holding. So
on the facts of some cases we might have underwriters immune from any
liability under the act. 43 If the practice as regards underwriting continues
as it has in the past in this country, however, there usually would be at
least one banking house as regards a particular issue falling within the
definition of "underwriter" in the Act, for as noted above the practice has
been for the banking group contracting with the company to perform a
distribution function. Any other bankers participating directly or in-
directly in such an undertaking or in the underwriting of such an under-
taking would therefore be underwriters under the Act.
Reference has been made above to the increased liability under the Act
of investment bankers (as "underwriters") who seek to protect securities
43 Before the enactment of prohibitory legislation the life insurance companies were in a po-
sition to, and did, perform strict underwriting. The necessity for greater marketability in the
investment portfolios of other insurance companies and banks probably preclude their partici-
pation, but investment trusts might find this a desirable business.
Even if such strict underwriting were available, however, two factors would probably make
it impracticable. Few such underwriters would be in a position to perform that function con-
tinuously without turning over their capital and if such a turnover were implicit in the business
it might readily be held that their commitments were with a "view to distribution." Secondly,
a "view to distribution" is no more than a motive and there would be no way in which any
underwriter could be certain that some other underwriter might not subsequently be held to
have had such a motive, so that his "participation in any such undertaking" might make him
also an "underwriter" under § 2(11).
Under date of Sept. 22, 1933 the Federal Trade Commission ruled as follows on one meaning
of distribution in § 2(11): "A person, the chief part of the business of which consists in the
purchase of the securities of any one issuer, its subsidiary and/or affiliate and in the sale of its
own securities to furnish the proceeds with which to acquire the securities of such issuer, sub-
sidiary and/or affiliate, is to be regarded as engaged in the distribution of the securities of such
issuer, subsidiary and/or affiliate within the meaning of Section 2(ri)."
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which they have originated. Thus in case a company was in the process of
voluntary reorganization or a refunding program was desired, it has been
rather common for investment bankers to occupy prominent places on
committees organized to facilitate the exchange of securities. Under the
Act the investment banker acting as "depositor" or manager of such a
committee is subject to new liabilities. As "depositor" or manager where
certificates of deposit are issued for securities of the company he would be
liable as an issuer 44 under the Act and liable pursuant to § i i for the cer-
tificates of deposit. And even though he is not such an issuer, § 15 would
impose the liability of an issuer on him if by formal or informal arrange-
ment he "controls" the issuer of the certificates of deposit. And even
though the committee of which he is "depositor" or manager, or the com-
mittee which he controls, is accepting deposits of securities of a company
in bankruptcy or receivership, such liability might be imposed. In the
first place such securities to be exempt under § 4(3) must be of a corpora-
tion "in the process of a bona fide reorganization" under the "supervision
of any court." Committees, however, frequently are formed too early to
determine with finality whether or not there will be a reorganization or
liquidation and often before it can be said that the court is supervising4 a
"bona fide reorganization." The risks of action within the interim period
are obvious. In the second place § 4(3) probably intends to give exemption
solely to exchanges between a corporation and its security holders and not
between a committee and security holders. 46 If that is true, there need be a
registration statement covering the certificates of deposit. On that the
"depositor" or manager would appear as issuer.
Or, again, the banker may be a member of a committee to induce the
exchange of securities directly with the company or through the agency
of a depository or other fiscal agent. To be sure § 4(3) exempts the issu-
ance of a security of a "person exchanged by it" with its existing security
44 § 2(4) defines "issuer" to mean "with respect to certificates of deposit" the "person or
persons performing the acts and assuming the duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the
provisions of the .... instrument under which such securities are issued." Under § 4(I) the
committee might possibly be exempt from necessity to register the certificates since the trans-
action was "not with or through an underwriter" and did not involve "any public offering."
It is by no means clear, however, that such solicitation could not amount to a public offering.
4S Cf. Lowenthal, The Investor Pays (1933).
46 The section is ambiguous. The previous clause (dealing with an exchange of securities
with existing security holders) is limited to the issuance by the company ("exchanged by it").
The subsequent clause dealing with judicial reorganization does not qualify "issuance of se-
curities." So it is at least arguable that certificates of deposit are included in the exemption. It
seems, however, that the implications of the section are to restrict the exemption to issuance by
a corporation which is in such process of reorganization.
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holders "exclusively" provided "no commission or other remuneration is
paid or given directly or indirectly" in connection with the exchange. So
that if the depository was receiving no fee or commission and if no other
party (such as fiscal agents, transfer agents, or others) was receiving any
remuneration, the exchange would be an exempt transaction. But it
would be the exception rather than the rule to find no one receiving re-
muneration. Hence it would seem necessary to register the "security." 47
If the section means what it says, some impetus may be given to re-
ceivership or bankruptcy proceedings because of the hazards involved in
voluntary readjustment and refunding programs. This tendency will be
accentuated if "commission or other remuneration" in § 4(3) is not re-
stricted to commissions for soliciting exchanges.
There are, moreover, other problems raised by § 2 (ii) which should be
resolved by clarifying amendments. An issuer who elects or is forced to
perform its own distribution under the Act may find its hands tied. If it
operates through brokers and dealers giving them only the regular or cus-
tomary brokers' or dealers' commission, nevertheless the brokers and
dealers might well become "underwriters" under the Act and therefore
liable for the whole issue. As previously pointed out the word "sell" is
broadly used in the Act and not restricted to its narrow legal sense. It
would embrace the activities either of a broker or dealer in distributing a
security for an issuer on a commision basis. Therefore either a broker or
dealer would be liable as "underwriter" unless he were protected by other
provisions of the Act. Section 2(ii) exempts from the definition of "un-
derwriter" a person whose interest is limited to a commission from an
underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary distribu-
tors' or sellers' commission. Therefore dealers or brokers who distribute
in such fashion for underwriters would not be underwriters under the Act.
But dealers or brokers 41 who distribute for issuers would be. The result
is that the issuer Who desired to do its own distributing through broker
47 Difficulty in obtaining a registration might be expected in case of foreign issues presently
outstanding. Query, if the banker, as member of a committee or otherwise solicits or seeks to
induce the exchange of securities might he not be held as an underwriter? "Sell" as defined in-
cludes "attempt or offer to dispose of." Therefore might he be held to be selling "for an issuer
in connection with the distribution of any security"? If so, no matter if he acts gratuitously
and does not himself accept or exchange securities, he may be acting as underwriter and be li-
able civilly under § ii as well as criminally under §§ 17 and 24. It could be agreed that while in
no strict sense an "agent" of the company in soliciting the exchange, nevertheless in a realistic
sense he was acting for its benefit and with its general advice and approval. The consensual ar-
rangement between them might result in him being held to have sold "for the issuer." Possibly,
though not probably, investment counsel or financial writers might similarly creep in as under-
writers.
48 § 4(2).
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and dealer channels might find brokers and dealers throughout the land
unwilling to assume responsibility for the whole issue. An obvious dodge
would be for the issuer to make a strawman an "underwriter" and then
proceed to have him contract with brokers and dealers who thereby would
not become "underwriters." 49 But it seems unfortunate to have tu resort
to such a palpable dodge in order to carry out the intent and design of
the Act.
The liabilities of brokers and dealers in retailing securities will be dis-
cussed hereafter. In passing, however, it should be noted that there are
still further chances for a dealer to be held liable as an underwriter under
the Act. By express provision § 2(11) exempts from classification as "un-
derwriter" a person whose "interest is limited to a commission from an
underwriter or dealer not in excess of the usual and customary distribu-
tors' or sellers' commission." Would a member of a selling syndicate de-
scribed above be liable? That depends on the construction of "usual and
customary distributors' or sellers' commission." The phrase needs clarifi-
cation. It is doubtful if "distributors' " is used synonymously with "un-
derwriters.' " If so, the exception would swallow most of the rule. Ac-
cordingly it would seem that the exception meant to exempt purchases
at wholesale (that is at retail price less a selling commission) and sales-
men's commissions from dealers. If that is the meaning, the line of cleav-
age in the section is not between wholesaling and retailing, but between
ordinary retail (and perhaps wholesale) commissions, on the one hand,
and, on the other, compensation (or possibility of compensation) for some
service whose performance it was thought might tend to increase the in-
centive and pressure for quick and permanent placement of securities with
the public. Since subscriptions by selling group members in advance of
customer orders (discussed in the following section) would produce
essentially the same incentives as participation in many sorts of selling
syndicates, however, this rule may be questioned, or it is to be inferred
that such subscriptions place dealers in the category of "underwriters."
It is, however, by no means clear that the Act is restricted to public
marketing or offering of securities, though the "take off" point (as Berle
puts it) seems at first blush to be the public offer. It is obvious that the
criminal penalties under § 17 and civil liabilities imposed under § i2 have
no relation to public offer. Those liabilities follow even as respects a sim-
ple, isolated transaction in no sense publicso And apart from this excep-
49 There is some reason to believe that this device is already being developed by certain
issuers.
so The language in § 12 is "any person who sells." § 2(3) in its definition of "sell" does not
restrict it to public sales.
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tion the -aim of the Act seems at times to be the regulation of issues how-
ever offered and at other times the control of issues publicly offered.
"Offered to the public" or "public offering" are only occasionally used.
They are used to describe the amount of damages in § ii (g); securities ex-
empt from the Act under § 3 (a) (i); and exempt transactions under § 4(I).
But though any security sold or disposed of by the issuer or bona fide
offered to the public prior to July 27, 1933 is exempt, nevertheless "any
new offering of any such security" is not so exempt.-5 Conceivably "new
offering" need not be public. Purely private offerings might well suffice.
Again prospectus is defined as a circular, etc. which "offers" any security
for sale.52 Here, again, the element of "public offer" is lacking. Similarly in
the definition of "sell." 5 3 Accordingly when these words "prospectus" or
''sell" are used they apply to isolated and private as well as to public
offerings or sales. Thus the penalties of § 5 are by no means limited in
application to public issues. Similarly in the restrictions of the use of a
prospectus under § io. Nor is the liability under § ii limited to issues
publicly offered.5 4 The criterion used throughout the Act is the use of
agencies of interstate commerce or of the mails,s5 not public offering. And
on that point the Act is in sharp contrast to the English Companies Act.s6
It is at least arguable that the exigencies of the situation call for more
extensive control than control over public offerings would give.5 7 That
point need not be debated here. But it is important to note the confusion
that has crept into certain parts of the Act by failing to state whether or
not the principle of public offering is applicable. Other concepts (some of
them even vaguer than the vague one of "public offer") have been substi-
tuted. These remain undefined. Thus an underwriter is one who acts in
connection with the "distribution" of any security. "Distribution" is used
again to describe non-exempt transactions of a dealer. Distribution com-
S' § 3(a) (1). S- § 2(10). -3 § 2(3).
54" . . . . any person acquiring such security .... may .... sue." But note § xI(g)
which limits damages to the price at which the securities were "offered to the public."
55 As qualified by note 17, supra.
56 § 37 of the English Act gives rights to "all persons who subscribe for any shares or deben-
tures on the faith of the prospectus" where the "prospectus invites persons to subscribe." § 380
defines "prospectus" as "any prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, or other invitation,
offering to the public for subscription or purchase any shares or debentures of a company."
57 Certain devices for circumventing the "public offer" are reported to have developed in
England. In 116 Economist 305 (1933) it is said, "This provision does not apply to shares and
debentures not offered to the public-an exception which includes the increasingly important
type of issue made by 'Stock Exchange introduction,' which accounted for as much as £ i5l
millions of new capital last year. In this respect, however, the investor enjoys complete pro-
tection through the salutary stringency of the regulations laid down by the Stock Exchange
Committee."
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monly carries perhaps the connotation of public offer or sale. But not
necessarily so.
Again (in Schedules A and B particularly) the phrase "to be offered" is
used in describing the security which must be registered. It is mostly used
without any limitation as to public offer."5 But occasionally, as in Schedule
A (i6) and in Schedule B (9), data is required as to the price at which the
security shall be "offered to the public."
A strict interpretation of the Act would indicate that except as re-
stricted by the word "public" the words "offered," "distribution," "offer-
ing" etc. meant any offering or distribution. On the other hand authori-
ties on the Act have conveyed the impression that those parts which we
are now considering related to and regulated only public offerings.59 The
point here is not to urge its restriction or broadening. But the Act needs
amendments to clarify the ambiguity, confusion, and uncertainty attend-
ant on its present phraseology.
If the standard of public offer were adopted, the Act would follow the
English precedent. Even so ambiguities would remain; for what is a public
as distinguished from a private offering? That probably would not be sus-
ceptible to statutory definition. ° It seems of necessity a matter for defini-
tion by accretion of judicial decisions. The fact of the matter is that that
problem apparently has caused no great confusion in England.6' And
s8 See e.g. Schedule A (io), (i1), (i3), (15), (i8), (21); Schedule B (2), (3), (8), (1o).
s9 E.g. this impression is gathered throughout H. R., 73 d Cong., ist Sess., Rep. No. 85. See
particularly pp. 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, x5, i6.
60 There are, however, instances where "public offer" should be more clearly defined either
by exceptions or otherwise. Thus § 4 exempts transactions by dealers except, inter alia, trans-
actions "within one year after the last date upon which the security was bona fide offered to
the public by the issuer or by or through an underwriter." This date might be the termination
of the syndicate; the date of the last advertisement by issuer, underwriter, or dealer; the last
solicitation by salesmen; or if the stock was listed on an exchange that alone might constitute
a public offering. If the last offering by a salesman was construed to be the last date of public
offer, the rule would be unworkable. In determining a formula for ascertaining such date no
fixed principle is involved. For administrative purposes, however, such provisions need clarity
and definitiveness.
61 Under the Companies Act of i9o8 (§ 81) "every prospectus issued," by or on behalf of a
company had to contain certain information. And a prospectus was defined (§ 285) as "any
prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, or other invitation, offering to the public" shares or
debentures. In Nash v. Lynde, [1929] A. C. 158 (a suit by a purchaser of shares against a director
for damages for failure to include in the prospectus certain required data), the court did not
pass directly on the meaning of the phrase "offering to the public" but the phrase received some
discussion. Viscount Sumner said, "No particular members are prescribed. Anything from two
to infinity may serve: perhaps even one, if he is intended to be the first of a series of subscribers,
but makes further proceedings needless by himself subscribing the whole. The point is that
the offer is such as to be open to anyone who brings his money and applies in due form, whether
the prospectus was addressed to him on behalf the company or not. A private communication
is not thus open ..... " Id. at 169. And Lord Buckinaster stated, "A document is not a pro-
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while it is easy to state cases that fall within the shadowland of uncertain-
ty, the general standard is sufficiently specific as to indicate the general
distinctions and to give warning of transgression. That is more than can
be said for the present Act which wobbles somewhere on middle ground.
RETAhING
For his stock in trade the retail dealer has relied upon four expedients:
membership in syndicates or selling groups managed by large originators or
spectus unless it is an invitation to thepublic, but if it satisfied the condition it is not the less a
prospectus because it is issued to a defined class of the public." Id. at 171. The case, however,
turned on whether or not a prospectus had been "issued." It was held that though "issued"
was not defined it would be taken to imply "some measure of publicity, however modest." As
Viscount Sumner said "I do not think that the term is satisfied by a single private communica-
tion between friends, even if they are business friends ..... Though literally it is true that the
issue is not expressly said .... to be an issue to the public, I think that it must be so in sub-
stance, otherwise any private letter, written by a person engaged in forming a company and
advising his correspondent to take share, would become an issued prospectus if other letters
were written by him asking others to do the same." Id. at i68-i69. And see Twycross
v. Grant, [1877] 2 C. P. Div. 469, 540. Lord Buckmaster added that "a distribution of a pro-
spectus among a well defined class of the public would be an issue within the meaning of § S1.
.... A document is not a prospectus unless it is an invitation to the public, but if it satisfied
this condition it is not the less a prospectus because it is issued to a defined class of the public."
Id. at 170-171. In the case the directors had prepared a statement of the condition of the com-
pany with a proposal that certain preference shares (not then authorized) be issued to raise
additional capital. This statement was circulated among the directors and to a solicitor who it
was thought might be able to interest some wealthy client in the business. Through the solici-
tor plaintiff became interested, was employed by the company for a term and subscribed to
ordinary shares of the company, not to the preference shares described in the communication.
Earlier it had been held that a prospectus marked "For private circulation only" and only
circulated among 3,000 people who were shareholders in other companies in which the promoter
was interested was nonetheless an offer to the public. In re South of England Natural Gas &
Petroleum Co. Ltd., [igii ] i Ch. 573.
But a circulation of a prospectus by a member of a syndicate to his friends was held not to
be an offer "to the public" giving plaintiff-subscriber a right to recover under the Companies
Act of i9oo the amount paid by him on shares, the claim being that since there had been a public
offering and the minimum subscription had not been obtained plaintiff had a statutory right to
the return of his payment. Mr. justice Warrington said that an offer to the public meant an
offer of shares to anyone who should choose to come in. Sherwell v. Combined Incandescent
Mantles Syndicate Ltd., 23 T.L. Rep. 482 (1907). The court also interpreted the statute giving
the right to rescission to mean a public offer by the company not by some individual without
authority from the company. Accord: Sleigh v. Glasgow & Transvaal Options Ltd., 6 Sess.
Cas. 420 (1904) (circulation of a document by promoters' directors to friends, case arising
under Companies Act of i9oo in action against company to have plaintiff's name removed from
register of shares. "Prospectus" was defined in the Act as it is presently defined in the Act of
1929).
Interpretations of "public offering" under Blue Sky Laws are of some utility. Gillespie v.
Long, 212 Ala. 34, ior So. 651 (1924).
More remote analogies arise in construction of "agencies for public use" under public utility
statutes. See e.g. Terminal Taxicab Co. Inc. v. District of Columbia, 241 U.S. 252, 36 Sup. Ct..
583 (1915); Anderson v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 228 N.Y. 475,-127 N.E. 584 (1920).
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the principal underwriters of issues; purchases from, or sales against, the
commitments of such members either at a "dealer's concession"6 2 allowed
under syndicate or selling group agreements or on an "investment guaran-
teed" basis in contravention of most such agreements;3 selling against
other inventory of other dealers at some agreed-upon discount; its own
trading department's purchases in advance of or to fill customer orders for
a trading profit; commission sales, usually without commitment, for issuers
or affiliates of issuers; and their own originations. The importance of these
various sources of inventory has varied with the times. 4 Except for a few
large retailing organizations and the retail departments of originating
houses, their own originating is not an important source. Trading is the
resource of the house without syndicate affiliation, the means of providing
a diversified inventory to meet the various requirements of customers, and
the method of providing inventory when other sources are unproductive.
Dealer commissions or reallowances are too small (typically 1 of x%) to be
profitable, and "investment guaranteed" selling is unimportant in the
aggregate.
The retail business has been largely dependent, therefore, upon the
large originating houses and to some extent directly upon issuers (or the
security affiliates of issuers)6 s for its securities. Wholesaling methods in
the majority of instances employed some form of underwriting by the re-
tailer, so that risks of sale were further spread from the much smaller
group of original or intermediate underwriters over the whole group, usu-
ally some hundreds, of retailers. It was the aim of the originating under-
writer to accomplish this wide distribution of risk as nearly as possible
simultaneously with his own acceptance of a commitment. The under-
writing provided by retail dealers was thus both real and an incentive for
them to sell. Selling groups in which retailers promptly subscribed for the
amounts offered them constituted as effective a method of risk spreading
62 Not to be confused with the "usual and customary distributors' or ellers' commission" of
§ 2(11), though it would probably be included in that definition.
63 Cf. Galston, Security Syndicate Operations (rev. ed., 1928), New York: Ronald Press,
pp. 55 and 120-122. Also, Bates & Douglas, op. cit., supra, note 15, 41 Yale L. Jour. 949, 951
(1932).
64 Unlike most other merchants the security retailer obviously cannot depend upon a con-
tinuous or stable volume of new inventory being supplied him.
65 While never of primary importance, yet at times and for some classes of retail houses, the
original or secondary distribution (cf. Bates & Douglas, op. cit., supra, note I5, 41 Yale L. Jour.
949, 952 (1932) of cortain investment trust and utility holding company stocks for the issuer
(or an affiliate) has proved a not inconsiderable source of revenue, especially since dealers were
seldom required in those cases to bear any of the risk of sale, but only to sell for a commission.
which might, however, be contingent upon investment placement for a stipulated period.
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as the selling syndicates. Those in which subscriptions were made only
against firm orders from customers, however, left the risk of sale upon the
"underwriters."
Retail selling commissions naturally varied with market conditions, the
kinds of securities, and the nature of the commitments taken, so that it is
difficult to name any normal or average commission, except in the light of
those factors. Most of them, however, would have fallen in a range of
from i% to 3 -%. In the case of selling syndicates the additional gross
spread for underwriting (against which expenses and losses were charge-
able) would usually have amounted to from of i% to i -o. Taking the
total gross spread for a selling syndicate at from 2 2% to 42%, some esti-
mate of the economy achieved in distributing expense may be gained by
comparable retailing spreads for other commodities and services. One
comparison might be with automobiles selling at retail for about $2,000
(somewhere in the neighborhood of the unit of sale for securities), where
the average retail spread would probably be from 3 to 7 times that for
securities.
It has been noted in a preceding section how it would be wholly possible
to make dealers and brokers "underwriters" under the Act. Selling syndi-
cate participation would probably place a retail dealer in this category.
Whether a selling group member would be so classed is less clear. Sub-
scription by a dealer for securities on selling group terms in advance of
firm orders from customers might take him out of the exemption in
§ 2 (1).66 The same effect might follow from any provision in the selling
agreement requiring him to repurchase securities originally sold by him
which came back upon the market during a specified period.67
Assuming, however, that they are not "underwriters" under the Act,
they are nevertheless subjected to considerable regulation. Dealers are
defined so as to include brokers.68 But brokers are given some exemptions
'§ 4(1), however, apparently differentiates "dealers" from "underwriters" and with ref-
erence to the former excepts from exemption "transaction as to securities constituting the whole
or a part of an unsold allotment to or subscription by such dealer as a participant in the distribu-
tion of such securities," with the seeming inference that participation and commitment for se-
curities does not make such a dealer an "underwriter."
67 Query, however, whether the contingency of his commission jupon investment placement,
could be held to have that effect.
68 § 2(12). But the definition is even broader than what are normally described as security
merchants and security brokers. It includes "any person who engages either for all or part of
his time, directly or indirectly, as agent, broker or principal, in the business of offering, buying,
selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities by another person." Accordingly it is broad
enough to include individual investors, investment trusts, banks, insurance companies, etc. A
happier way of accomplishing the legislative intent would have been to limit it to persons en-
gaged directly or indirectly in the "business of distributing securities at wholesale or retail."
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not shared by other "dealers." For example, unless a security is registered
it is in two circumstances unlawful for a "dealer" to make use of any
means of interstate commerce or of the mails to "sell or offer to buy" the
security or to deliver the security for sale or after sale. It is likewise unlaw-
ful to transmit a prospectus unless the prospectus meets with the require-
ments of the Act or to deliver the security unless accompanied or preceded
by a proper prospectus. Violation of these provisions subjects the "dealer"
to criminal liability,9 and also subjects him to civil liability under § 1:2 giv-
ing the person who purchases from him a right of rescission or damages ipso
facto. The first of these circumstances is a transaction by the "dealer" with-
in a year after the last date upon which the security was bona fide offered
to the public.7o The vagueness of the rule has been commented upon above.
The other instance is the distribution by the dealer of the whole or a part
of an unsold allotment to or subscription by the dealer as a participant in
the distribution of such securities by the issuer or underwriter.7' So as re-
spects new issues of securities the "dealer" must be in a position within a
year after the last date of the public offer to have the security registered
and to have available in all his transactions as "dealer" sufficient prospec-
tuses to satisfy the requirements of § 5. And in case he has taken a com-
mitment under a selling group (and even though he is not an underwriter),
he is restricted in a similar way but to a greater extent since there is no
time limitation of a year or any other period when his duty to conform to
§ 5 would terminate.
Two illustrations of possible hardships on dealers may be given. As has
been noted securities issued in the process of a bona fide reorganization
"under the supervision of any court" need not be registered for the pur-
poses of such issuance.72 Nevertheless for one year after their issuance
(assuming the issuance to amount to a public offering) dealers' transac-
tions in these securities would violate the Act unless the securities were
registered. No machinery is set up whereby a registration can be ob-
tained. And in view of the severity of the penalties on registration state-
ments it is doubtful if registration statements would be made unless
necessary. Dealers may through their trading departments unwarily get
trapped with such inventory and have their hands tied for a year.
Additional complications of a similar kind arise in case of the buying
and selling of securities after the expiration of thirteen months from the
effective date of the registration statement. A prospectus where so used
69 § 24. Note also possible liability under § 17 discussed, supra, note i8.
70 "by the issuer or by or through an underwriter." § 4(l). 71 § 4(1).
7' § 4(3). It is by no means clear that this is not a "public" offer and therefore that the
transaction by the dealer is exempt under § 4().
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must contain information not more than twelve months old.7 3 The Act
gives no dealer the power to obtain a freshly dated prospectus. There
might well be reluctance on the part of the issuer to supply it, because of the
additional uncompensated risk involved. So far then as the dealer market
goes fluidity of certain securities at certain times may be greatly curtailed.
If, however, the "dealer" (as defined in the Act) merely acts as broker,74
he is exempt from such regulation except as indicated hereafter. The se-
curity need not be registered and no prospectus need be furnished or sent
even though agencies of interstate commerce or the mails are used. But if
the broker solicits orders he is liable in the same fashion as other "deal-
ers."' 5 Solicitation is not defined. Litigation on this point under Blue
Sky Laws has been great. Certainly the line between solicitation and
mere acceptance of orders is (and perhaps must remain) vague. The point
at which the draftsmen are aiming seems clear. When the pressure for dis-
tribution begins to be applied the parties applying it are placed under a
duty to furnish the investor with information respecting the security
which the Act deems pertinent. Upon "dealers," however, they may have
placed restrictions not necessary to this purpose, because applied as well
to mere sale without sales effort.
But the Act has even more far reaching effects on the retailing of se-
curities..As noted, "dealers" (including brokers) may be liable civilly un-
der § 1 2 (and criminally) if § 5 is violated. They may also be liable under
§ 12 though the security purchased or sold is exempt from other provi-
sions of the Act. Thus a dealer (in the strict sense) "sells" a railroad bond
which need not be registered, 6 by the use of an agency of interstate com-
merce or of the mails. If the "prospectus or oral communication" includes
an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements not misleading (the purchaser
not knowing of such untruth or omission) and the dealer does not prove
that he did not know and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known of the untruth or omission, he is liable to the purchaser from him
either for damages or rescission. This civil penalty is applicable not only
to dealers but to "any person" who "sells" a security, with the possible
exception of brokers discussed hereafter. The result will be in the direc-
tion of the dealer supplying full information or giving no information ex-
cept the name of the security and its price. Intermediate declarations by
the dealer become hazardous. Market letters by dealers become risky.
Oral advice becomes dangerous if related to an interstate transaction.
As to brokers the liability under § 12(2) is at best ambiguous. If a bro-
ker "sells" he is liable to the person "purchasing" from him. A strict bro-
713 §io(b) (i). 74 § 4(2). 7- § 4(2). 76 § 3(a) (6).
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ker was held as a matter of common law not to sell. The person who pur-
chased got title through, not from, him.77 Yet "sell" is defined in the Act
so broadly as to include a broker's activities.75 He certainly is making a
"disposition of" the security; or an "attempt or offer to dispose of" the
security; or a "solicitation of an offer to buy." "Purchase" is not defined.
But if it is taken to mean the correlative of "sell" as defined in the Act
the broker assumes a liability under § 12(2). It would seem at first blush
that it was not the sense of the Act to embrace brokers at this point. But
it could well be argued that brokers were intended for inclusion. They are
not exempt from § 5 if they solicit orders. Brokers' market letters may
well be construed as soliciting orders.79 If they make any such statement
about a security they run the danger of being afoul of § 5. Since state-
ments amounting to solicitation bring them in under § 12(i) perhaps state-
ments inaccurately describing the security bring them in under § 12(2).
At least the Act needs clarification on this point.
CONCLUSION
The Act has been in effect for too brief a period during which too many
other factors of major consequence have been operative to permit proof of
its incidence in many particular respects. The relative parts played by
market conditions, by the unwillingness of issuers and their officers to as-
sume the new obligations of the Act, by unwillingness of issuers and bank-
ers to operate in the face of risks arising solely from the ambiguity in the
Act, and by the hesitancy of banking houses of substance to incur the new
risks are matters of estimate rather than informed judgment.
Nor, as pointed out at the beginning of this essay, is it possible to pre-
dict with any degree of accuracy what the future course will be.1° In
terms merely of increased business and legal risks, however, a few rather
general conclusions have been drawn. It may be that underwriting as it
has been performed in this country will practically disappear. Or fewer
substantial houses may underwrite, with a consequent effect upon the size
and kinds of issues and the relative abilities of various issuers to obtain
capital. Or, again, a host of impecunious persons (not necessarily straw-
men) may appear and take over, perhaps the name but not the function
of, origination and underwriting. Or, with or without clarifying amend-
77 See note i6, supra.
78 It is possible, though not likely, that the section woqld also cover the case of a broker not
"selling" for himself or his principal.
79 The effectiveness of a "hedge" clause to the effect that the letter is "not to be construed
as a solicitation of orders" for the security described may be questioned.
so Certain predictions of effects have been made by Dean, The Federal Securities Act: 1, 8
Fortune 50 (1933).
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ments to the Act, substantial houses may contrive to do business as in the
past (if securities are available to them from prospective issuers), for it
should be remembered that theirs is a fraternity not unused to accepting
risks subject to no mathematical bases of appraisal. On the other hand,
the attitude of issuers and their officers and directors toward the new
risks may be largely controlling. Thus if the Act is as revolutionary as
some think, the raising of capital will be seriously hindered and the meth-
ods employed will take quite different forms. In such processes invest-
ment bankers as they are known today may have little or no place.
Viewed broadly as a function, however, investment banking will still be
performed, though possibly wholly or in part by other institutions. Those
might be the issuers, governmental agencies,8' or financial institutions
other than "investment bankers." The Act presupposes no such shift.
But if its direct or indirect effect is such an induced transference it is per-
haps time to consider the larger issue on its merits. Such an effect, of
course, is no necessary corollary to providing investors with the "truth
about securities"-a purpose needing no consideration except as to the
means of its accomplishment.
Meanwhile a major problem is the elimination from the Act of its am-
biguities and inconsistencies. In that connection it should be said with
Felix Frankfurter that: "Like all such legislative beginnings, the Act
must be deemed definitive merely in principle and not in detail.' '1 2 Insofar
as there are ambiguities and inconsistencies in the Act it should be
promptly amended. To await an accretion of judicial decisions to clarify
these ambiguities seems undesirable. Those decisions, especially since
they will be coming from the courts of all the states and territories as well
as from the federal system, will be slow to acquire even a semblance of uni-
formity. The interim will be beneficial to no one except the legal profes-
sion. Incidental effects may be the paralyzing of legitimate activity. If
there are any standard specifications for legislation they are clarity and
consistency. Risks are significant to business. The ability to predict those
risks and to conform to the spirit and design of the legislation is of great
moment, though it is never possible in all cases no matter the degree of
clarity in the law. There will always remain room for play by the courts in
adapting legislation to new and changing conditions and in permitting the
experiment to evolve against the urge for strict and technical construction.
But that growth calls for clear expression of principle and consistent and
unambiguous treatment of atetail.
81 In this connection see the challenging consideration of the possible r6le of the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation by Berle in High Finance: Master or Servant, 23 Yale Review 2o
(1933).
8, The Federal Securities Act: II, 8 Fortune 5o, 109 (1933).
